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Abstract 
We design and cvaluate a simple and scalable system to verify Quality of Service (QoS) in a differentiated ser- 
vices domain. The system uscs a distributed edge-to-edge monitoring approach with measurement agents collecting 
information about delays. losses and thl-oughput. and reporting to a Service Level Agreement Monitor (SLAM). 
The SLAM detects potential service violations. bandwidth theft. denial of scrvice attacks, and flags the need to re- 
dimension the network domain or limit its users. Measurements n ~ a y  be performed entirely edge-to-edge. or the core 
routers may pa~iicipate in logging packet drop infolmation. We compare the core-assisted and edge-to-edge schemes. 
and we extend network tomography-based loss inference mechanisms to cope with different drop precedences in a 
QoS network. We also develop a load-based service monitol-ins scheme which probes the appropriate edge routers for 
loss and throughput on demand. Simulation results indicate that the system detects attacks with reasonable accuracy. 
and is useful for dainaze control in both QoS-enabled and best effort network domains. 
Keywords: Sel-vice Level Agreements, Network Tomography. Network Monitol-ing, Network Security. Quality of 
Sewice. 
1 Introduction 
Internet security lapses have cost U.S. corporations 5.7 percent of their annual revenue, as reported by University of 
California at Davis economist Frank Bernhard [13]. Specifically: the increase in the number of denial of service attacks 
(1 2:805 reported by the San Diego Supercomputer Center in February 200 1 [24]), implies that bandwidth theft attacks 
can become widespread in networks with Quality of Service (QoS) support. Hence, monitoring network activity is 
required to maintain confidence in the security and QoS of networks, from both the user (ensuring the service level 
paid for is indeed obtained) and provider (ensuring no unusual activity or attacks take place) perspectives. Developing 
a low cost distributed monitoring system is the primary focus of this paper. 
We use the differentiated services (DS) QoS framework as an underlying network, though our system is not specific 
to DS. Packets entering a DS domain are classified and the DS field in the 1P header is marked at the edge router [25]. 
The packets then experience specific per-hop behaviors (PHBs) as they are forwarded by the interior (core) routers 
of the domain depending on their DS field. Currently, the Expedited Forwarding (EF) PHB [19] and the Assured 
Forwarding (AF) PHBs [18] have been defined. The EF PHB can be used to build a low loss, low latency, end-to-end 
service. The A F  PHB offers different levels of forwarding assurances, each with three drop precedences (e.g., green, 
yellow and red). Typically. a user has a service level agreement (SLA) with a provider that describes the expected 
service, user traffic profile: and charging models. The provider uses SLAs, along with other mechanisms, to provision 
the network appropriately. 
Differences in charging models of the service classes can attract attacks that inject marked packets to steal band- 
width and other network resources. Such attacks make use of known vulnerabilities in firewall filter rules to inject 
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traffic or spoof the identity of valid users with high QoS levels. Since the DS framework is based 011 aggregation of 
flows into service classes, valid user traffic may experience degraded QoS as a result of the injected traffic. Taken to an 
extreine, the attacks may result in denial of service. This creates a need for developing an effective defense mechanism 
that can auto~iiate the detection and reaction to attacks on the QoS-provisioned DS network domain. 
Although ~neasurenient of path characteristics 126: 271 and network monitoring [5,  14: 201 have been extensively 
investigated. few studies of user SLA validation have been performed [ lo] .  Inspired by recent results on network 
toniography [I :  6: 71: we infer internal characteristics of a network domain using edge-to-edge probes, and design a 
distributed monitoring system to detect service violations and bandwidth theft in a network domain. We employ agents 
011 selected routers of the DS domain to efficiently measure packet delays, loss, and throughp~~ts. Measurements are 
communicated to an SLA Monitor (SLAM). The SLAM analyzes measurements and automatically detects potential 
attacks aiid violations of negotiated SLAs, as well as flag the need to re-provision the network by increasing capacity 
or limiting users. 
We also compare core-assisted and pure edge-to-edge approaches for packet loss ratio computation. The compari- 
son can help network providers decide which technique best serves their needs. We inject probes only when necessary 
to reduce comnlunication overhead. Moreover, we extend stripe-based loss inference [I 51 to cope with different drop 
precedences in a QoS network. Throughput measurements are only performed when a delay or loss violation is re- 
ported. As with any detection mechanism, the attackers can attach the mechanism itself: but we assume the cost to 
attack this distributed monitoring mechanism is higher than the cost to inject or spoof traffic, or bypass a single edge 
router. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 describes the high- 
level architecture used in our service violation detection system. Section 4 gives the methodology of measurements and 
SLA violation detection. Section 5 discusses when to probe the network based on network load. Section 6 presents our 
si~nulation experiments and results. Finally, section 7 summarizes our conclusions and recommendations for enhanced 
security. 
2 Related Work 
A number of related studies have investigated differentiated services security, measurements of QoS parameters, net- 
work tomography and monitoring, and SLA verification. 
2.1 Network Security 
A security analysis for the differentiated services framework is provided in [32]. QoS attacks are classified as either 
attacking the network provisionitzg process, or attacking the data fonvardirzg process. Network provisioning involves 
configuration of DS nodes by policy distribution points in the network (Bandwidth Brokers (BBs)), through RSVP 
[4] or SNMP [9]. This process can be attacked by injecting bogus configuration messages, modifying the content of 
real configuration messages, delaying or dropping such messages. Networks can be secured against such attacks by 
employing encryption of the configuration messages. Attacks on the data forwarding process are of a more serious 
nature and can involve injecting traffic into the network with an intent to steal bandwidth or to cause QoS degradation 
by causing other user flows to experience longer delays, higher loss rates, and lower throughput. Our goal is to detect 
attacks on the data forwarding process by monitoring the characteristics of a network domain. 
2.2 Performance Measurements 
A large body of research has focused on measuring delay, loss, and throughput in the Internet [26: 271. Shared Passive 
Network Performance Discovery (SPAND) [29] is a tool that communicates with distant Internet hosts and reports to 
a performance server in the same domain. Sharing history to improve future measurement was proven useful. Savage 
et al propose Detour routers as edge devices in Internet clouds that will tunnel traffic to improve Internet performance 
[28]. These edge routers exchange bandwidth, latency, drop rate among themselves. We also einploy intelligent routers 
at key access points that monitor a network domain. Resilient Overlay Networks (RON) is an architecture to detect 
and recover from path outages and periods of degraded perfom>ance [2]. RON nodes monitor the quality of Internet 
paths among then~selves and use this infonnation to route packets, optimizing application-specific routing metrics. 
RON uses three different routing metrics: latency, loss and throughput. Measurement techniques in SPAND. Detour, 
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2.3 Network Tomography 
Network ton~ography is an approach to infer the internal behavior of a network based on purely end-to-end measure- 
ments [3J]. A number of studies [ I .  6. 71 have shown how to infer loss and delay. and discover the topology of a 
multicast network. Coates and Nowark [I 1 .  121 discuss delay and loss inference using unicast probing in order to 
monitor TCP flows [31]. Duffield et al [I51 use packet "stripes" (back-to-back probe packets) to infer link loss by 
computing the correlations among packet losses within a stripe at the destinations. Using end-to-end unicast probing. 
the authors demonstrate how to infer loss characteristics of the links in the network interior. We extend this technique 
to infer loss in a QoS domain and show how to detect service violations and attacks in that domain based on inferred 
values. 
2.4 Network Monitoring 
Many proposals for network monitoring [5> 141 ensure that a network is operating within desirable parameters. In 
efficient reactive monitoring [ 141. the authors discuss ways to monitor communication overhead in IP networks. Their 
main idea is to combine global polling with local event driven reporting. Our core-assisted scheme also uses local event 
driven reporting and performs global polling only when it is absolutely necessary. Breitbart et al [5] identify effective 
techniques to monitor bandwidth and latency in IP networks. The authors present pr-obi~ig-based techniques where 
path latencies are measured by transmitting probes from a single point of control. The paper describes algorithms to 
compute an optimal set of probes to measure latency of paths in a network. We focus on monitoring a network domain 
to detect attacks. For scalability, our approach involves only edge routers in any QoS parameter measurement. 
2.5 SLA Verification 
In [lo], a histogram-based aggregation algorithm is used to detect SLA violations. The algorithm measures network 
characteristics on a hop-by-hop basis and uses them to compute end-to-end measurements and validate end-to-end 
SLA requirements. In large networks, efficient collection of management data is a challenge. While exhaustive data 
collection yields a complete picture, there is an added overhead. Furthermore. the authors assume that the routes used 
by SLA flows are known, citing VPN and MPLS [8] provisioning. We use average values to reduce constraints on the 
network setup, and eliminate the need for knowledge of the set of flows traversing each router. 
3 Architecture for SLA Violation Detection 
Differentiated Services (DS) [3] pushes complexity to boundary devices which process lower volumes of traffic. The 
boundary routers where traffic enters a domain, called ingress routers, perform traffic conditioning that consists of 
traffic classification based on multiple fields in the packet header, traffic metering to ensure conformance to a profile: 
marking, dropping, shaping or remarking of out-of-profile traffic. Core routers perform simple forwarding based on 
the DS field. SLAs between the user and provider networks are used to derive filter rules for traffic classification 
at the ingress routers. Therefore, ingress routers with appropriate configuration of filter rules should prevent non- 
conforming traffic from entering a DS domain. Though ingress routers serve as a good first line of defense. attackers 
can still succeed in injecting non-conforming traffic into a DS domain in a variety of ways, e.g.: 
I .  Attackers can impersonate a legitimate user by spoofing flow identity (IP addresses, protocol and port numbers). 
Network filtering [I 61 at routers in the user network can detect such spoofing if the attacker and the impersonated 
user are on different subnets, but the attacks proceed unnoticed otherwise. 
2. Attackers can devise meclianis~ns to bypass the ingress routers by exploiting some well known vulnerabilities in 
the firewall filters. Thus: they can inject traffic with their own identity and a desired destination. Alternatively. 
the traffic can be aggregated from multiple ingress routers. 
3. Legitimate users can send traffic in excess of their profiles. Ingress routers will re-mark excess traffic with a 
code point of a lower service class, e.g.. AF red packets or best effort, which affects other user flows of that 
lower class, as in a denial of service attack. 
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Such attacks and others escape detection at ingress routers. Co-ordination among boundary routers or support from 
core routers is required for detection. Changes that can be observed due to the attack traffic in the network include 
longer per-packet delays, l ~ i g l ~ e r  average buffer occupancy, and higher packet drop rates. We use these characteris- 
tics: specifically delays, loss ratios, and bandwidth achieved by flows after- aggregation within the domain to detect 
bandwidth theft attacks and service violations. 
Figure 1 depicts our proposed architecture. An SLA Monitor (SLAM) coordinates the monitoring activities inside 
the DS domain. In the figure, the SLAM is shown as a separate entity in a network domain. However, any edge 
router can take this responsibility as long as it has sufficient resources and computing capabilities. Loss ratios may 
be inferred on a pure edge-to-edge basis or using core router assistance. In the core-assisted scheme, egress and core 
routers send delay and loss measurements respectively to the SLAM for the flows in the domain. Upon request: the 
ingress sends the number of packets entering a domain per flow to calculate loss ratio. The packet loss is computed as 
the ratio of the packet drop inside a domain to the total packets entering the domain. Loss ratio of a flow is a better 
metric than loss rate (i.e., number of drops per second). Another alternative is to measure delay, loss or throughput 
using only edge routers using network tomography techniques. The SLAM maintains delay and loss information of 
misbehaving flows only. In addition, the SLAM maintains the SLA parameters for each user for a certain domain. By 
comparing the delay and loss measurements against the specific user SLA, we can identify potential SLA violations. 
4 QoS Parameter Measurement 
The SLA parameters used for detecting violations include delay, loss, and throughput. This section describes methods 
to measure and use these parameters to detect service violations. 
4.1 Delay Measurements 
Delay bound guarantees made by a provider network to user traffic flows are for the delays experienced by the flows 
between the ingress and egress routers of the provider domain. Delay measurements either use delay of real user traffic 
or injected traffic. The first approach is intrusive because encoding timestamps into the data packets would require 
changing the packets at the ingress and rewriting the original content at the egress after appropriate measurements. 
The second approach is non-intrusive in that we can inject probe packets with desired control information to enable 
an egress router to recognize such probes, perform measurements and delete the probes from the traffic stream. We 
adopt the second approach in our design. For each packet traversing an ingress router, with a certain pre-configured 
probability p,,.,b,; the ingress copies the packet IP header into a new probe packet. A timestamp tf,,,.,,, is encoded 
into the payload of flow i, and an identifier field is marked with a new value in the probe packet. The egress router 
removes probes from the traffic stream, and computes delay; for a packet from flow i of user j traffic as: 
where t&.,,, is the time the packet of flow i traverses the egress router. The egress forwards the packet details 
and the measured delay information to the SLAM. The encoded timestamp should follow a well-known f o m ~ a t ,  e.g., 
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), and a standard protocol like Network Time Protocol (NTP) should be used to 
maintain clock synchronization. Alternatively, the two-way delay from ingress to egress and back to ingress can be 
divided by two if links are approximately symmetric. At the SLAM, we classify the packet as belonging to flow i 
of user j and update the average packet delay of user j traffic, avgde lay j ,  using an exponential weighted moving 
average (EWMA): 
avgdelay j  = a  x avg-delayj + ( 1  - a)  x delay; (2) 
where CY is a small fraction to emphasize recent history rather than the current sample alone. If this average packet 
delay exceeds the delay guarantee in the SLA, we conclude that a service violation may have occurred. If the network 
is properly provisioned and all flows do not misbehave, delay for user j should not exceed its delay guarantee. 
Determining the probability with which we should inject probe packets is not an easy task. If there are n/I edge 
routers in a network domain, Ni flows (on the average) passing through an edge router i: andP;.obe is the probability 
that an edge router i and flow j will be selected to probe for latency, then is the average number of probe 
packets injected into the network domain. To keep the volun~e of these control messages low, we must select a low 

































the probing probability value dynamically over time at each edge router. The change in this probability is perfomled 
at all edge routers autonon~ously making sure the edges do not use the same random number generator sequence or 
seed. 
4.2 Loss Measurements 
Packet loss guarantees made by a provider network to a user are for the packet losses experienced by its conforming 
traffic inside the provider domain. To compute the loss ratio (rather than the less nleaningfi~l oss rate), the number of 
packet drops, as well as the number of packets traversing the domain: are required. Core routers can detect the number 
of packets dropped, and edge routers can compute the number of packets traversing the donlain. We refer to this 
loss measurenlent mechanism as the cor-e-ossisierl scheme for loss ~neasurenlent. An alternative mechanism is to use 
stripe-based probing to infer loss characteristics inside a domain [15]. A series of probe packets is sent, with no delay 
between the transmission of successive packets. or what is known as a "stripe." The scheme, which was designed as 
an end-to-end scheme, can be adapted to the edge-to-edge scenario and to QoS networks. We refer to this strategy as 
the edge-to-edge (or st,-ipe-Dosed) loss measurement scheme. 
4.2.1 Edge-to-Edge Stripe-based Loss Inference 
For a two-leaf binary tree spanned by the nodes 0, k l  R1. Rp (see figure 2): stripes are sent from the root 0 to the two 
leaves to estimate the characteristics of each of the 3 links. as proposed in [15]. If a packet reaches a receiver. we can 
infer that the packet reached the branch point k .  The first two packets of a 3-packet stripe are sent to a receiver. e.g.: 
R2, and the last one to the other receiver. A complementary stripe is sent in the reverse manner. The transmission 
probability An- for node k can be computed as: 
where Zi represents the empirical mean of a binary variable which takes the value 1 when all packets sent to i reach 
their destination and 0 otherwise. The mean is taken over n identical stripes. By combining estimates of stripes down 
each such tree. the characteristics of links 0 - k:  k - R1 and k - R2 can be estimated. This inference technique 
also extends to general trees. Consider an arbitrary tree where for each node k ,  R(k) denotes the subset of leaves 
descended from k .  Let Q(k) denote the set of ordel-ed pairs of nodes in R(k).  For each ( R l ,  R2) E Q ( k ) ,  a stripe 
should be sent from the root to the receivers R1 and Rp. 
A QoS network domain defines different traffic classes to provide differentiated services. We extend the above uni- 
cast probing scheme to routers with active queue management that supports different drop precedences. For exan~ple, 
the assured forwarding (AF) mechanism is realized using several queues where each queue has three drop precedences 
referred to as green, yellow. and red. The red traffic is dropped with a probability p,,d when the average queue size 
lies between two thresholds RmZn and Rmax. All incoming red packets are dropped when the average queue length is 
> Rmax. Let P',,, be the percentage of packet drops due to the behavior of active queue management for red packets, 
and let Piyelcow and Pig,een be defined similarly for yellow and green packets. These percentages can be computed 
as: 




Ymax - y;nTn Gmaz - Ymax 
Piyellom = X Pyellow + 
~ ' m a z  
where B is the buffer (queue) size. 
Let P,.,, = 1 -P',.ed be the percentage of red packets accepted by the active queue. We can define percentages for 
yellow and green traffic similarly using equations (5) and (6). Link loss can be inferred by subtracting the tra~~smission 
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red traffic, respectively, the loss of a traffic class is expressed as shown in equation (7): where n i  is number of samples 
taken from traffic of type i :  
ngpgrepnLg + R ~ P ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ , L ~  + nrPredLr 
Lc~ass = n g  + + n, 
However, when loss of green traffic is zero: we take the average of yellow and red losses. When the loss of yellow 
traffic is zero, we report only loss of red probes. 
4.2.2 Core-Assisted Loss Measurements 
An alternative method to measure loss is to record packet drops for every flow over a time interval At seconds at the 
core routers, and periodically report the values to the SLAM. The SLAM maintains the average number of packets 
dropped for user j :  avg-dropj, and updates it as: 
where a is a small fraction: and dropj is the total packet drop for user j over time interval At. The weighted 
average resolves the problem of wrap-around of the total packet drop count during the life time of a flow. To compute 
the loss ratio, incoming packet count information is obtained from ingress routers which anyway monitor all flows 
for profile checking: shaping and marking. This ensures that core routers need not transmit information to the SLAM 
unless there are sufficient packet drops to suspect attacks or violations. 
The procedure to compute the loss ratio, CrrlcLossRnrio, executed every At seconds, proceeds as follows: 
I .  Core i reports to the SLAM whenever packet drop of user j ,  drop:: exceeds a locrrl threshold 
2. The SLAM computes the total drop for time interval Att dropj = zZl drop:: where AT, is number of core 
routers. 
3. If the total drop for user j exceeds a global threshold 
a. The SLAM sends a query to all edge routers requesting their current rates for user j 
b. The SLAM computes total incoming rate for user j from all edge routers 
c. The SLAM computes the loss ratio for user j as the ratio of dropj and the total incoming rate for user 
j where both values are computed over the same interval 
d. If the loss ratio exceeds the SLA loss ratio for user j ,  a possible SLA violation is reported 
Selecting the local threshold value after which drops are reported by each core router is difficult since the core 
router does not have any information about the user SLAs. For each AF class k? we must compute a local drop 
threshold, Tk .  May et a \  [22] give the loss probability for an AF class k as: 
where Bk is the buffer size of the class k queue. a k ( n )  represents the probability that a class k packet is accepted 
given that n packets are in the queue and .irk ( n )  is the stationary distribution of the buffer content. The local threshold 
at each core router for class k packets can thus be set to Tk = ( L R k  + € ) A j :  where X j  is the expected arrival rate of 
user j :  and E is a small value. The local threshold limits state maintenance at the core router to the subset of the total 
number of flows experiencing the highest loss ratio, since we are only interested in flows that result in the aggregate 
traffic experiencing high loss ratio. If a flow exhibits a high loss ratio, however, this does not mean that this particular 
flow is misbehaving. Therefore, we employ throughput measurements as discussed next. 
4.3 Throughput Measurements 
The objective of throughput measurements is to ensure no user is consuming excessive bandwidth and starving others. 
This may not be detectable by a single ingress router if the user uses multiple ingress routers. The service provider 
typically employs policies which allow users to consume extra bandwidth of lower service classes. The SLAM probes 
egress routers for throughput following a loss or delay violation report. Each egress measures the average rate at 
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bandwidth consunled by the user at all egresses. If this throughput exceeds the SLA bandwidth then there may be a 
violation. The router may also periodically compute throughput values even in the absence of increased delay or loss 
as a sanity check. 
5 Load-based Monitoring 
In this section, we discuss load-based domain monitoring used to probe the network domain for loss and throughput 
only when attacks or violations are likely. As discussed in section 4? headers of delay probe packets are copied froin 
user packets so that the probes follow the same routes as the user packets. This technique is not applicable to loss 
measurement using stripes since the SLAM does not know the egress routers from which user packets leave. The 
stripe-based approach requires a pair of edge routers as receivers to send probe packets to, and we discuss how to 
detei-mine this pair of routers in this section. If many edge routers are idle or many links are under-utilized, the SLAM 
does not probe the entire domain for loss or throughput inforination. 
5.1 Probing Strategy 
Let E be the set of all domain edge routers (both egress and ingress). One of these routers can act as an SLA Monitor 
(SLAM), or a separate entity can be used to act as SLAM. The algorithm proceeds as follows: 
1. Each ingress router copies the header of user packets with probability p,,.,b, to probe the network for delays 
2. When an egress router receives these probes, the egress computes the edge-to-edge delay. If the delay exceeds 
a certain threshold, it reports delay along with the identity of both the ingress and egress routers to the SLAM. 
There is a trade-off between checking the threshold at the egress versus at the SLAM, because in the former 
case egresses need to maintain more information about the network domain, while the latter approach increases 
communication overhead 
3. The SLAM maintains the set of edge routers E' to send stripes tot in order to infer loss on active links, where 
E' C E .  The SLAM also maintains a spanning tree of the network topology. A set of edge routers, Si, which 
we refer to as colnplementary edges, is associated with each edge i. The next subsection explains how Si is 
constructed. At time tt the SLAM computes the set E' as: 
E' ( t )  = U ~i ( t )  
i 
Since E' C E ,  the communication overhead of probing for loss will be less than or equal to the communication 
overhead of probing all edges. Another improvement can be achieved by maintaining another level of nodes in 
the tree (parents) for each node. The SLAM can save probes by not using nodes at the same level and same 
parent as complenlentary nodes for any particular node i in the list. 
4. The SLAM probes the network for throughput approximation only when the inferred loss is higher than the 
pre-configured threshold. 
5.  Using delay, loss, and throughput approximations, the SLAM can detect violations or bandwidth theft attacks 
with reasonable accuracy 
5.2 Complementary Edges 
With stripe-based unicast probing, the source needs to send certain packets of a stripe to a receiver and the remainder 
of the stripe to a different receiver. Based on which shared link loss needs to be inferred, another edge router (leaf 
node) of the tree must be used as a complementary receiver. For a given node V. a sibling of V can serve as a 
conlplementary node for V .  We describe an algorithm to find complementary edges for each edge router of a given 
tree. These complementary edges will be used to infer link loss from the root to all links up to the closest coinlnon 
ancestor (CCA) of both receivers, and from the CCA to both end receivers. The union of the complementary edges of 
two edge routers will give all edge routers to use as receivers in the stripe-based methodology to infer loss of required 
links. 
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2. while P <> root of the tree 
Add leaf X to C' where CCA(V, X )  = P 
P t parent(P) 
3. return C' 
This algorithm only needs to be executed initially when the network is setup and when it is reconfigured with additional 
routersllinks. The result is stored at the SLAM. 
5.3 SLAM Functionality 
For each incoming delay control packet, the SLAM updates the average delay of the user using equation (2). Then 
it compares the delay to the SLA delay to detect violations for that user. If the delay has been violated, the SLAM 
updates the list of edges to send stripes to for loss inference. If there is any loss at the core for the E F  traffic class. an 
SLA violation is flagged. If the inferred A F  loss ratio exceeds a certain threshold, the SLAM queries the edges for user 
throughputs and checks whether there is a throughput violation. The SLAM also compares some report packet DS 
fields with the flow SLA to ensure that an attack does not occur in the form of injecting packets with a higher service 
than allowed for that user. For each violation, the SLAM informs the administrator who may choose to throttle that 
particular user traffic. 
6 Simulation Results 
We conduct a series of experiments to investigate the delay, loss, and throughput approximation methods described in 
section 4.  We use the ns-2 simulator [2311 with the standard differentiated services implementation by a group from 
Nortel Networks [30]. TCP New Reno is used: with a packet size of I024 bytes and a inaxinn~m window of 64 packets. 
We employ a similar network topology to the one in ( 151 to evaluate both the core-assisted and stripe-based loss ratio 
approximations. The topology is shown in figure 3. Multiple hosts are connected to all edges to create flows along all 
links in the topology. A number of flows from E l ,  E2 and E3 are destined to hosts connected to edge router E6 to 
simulate attacks on the link C4 - E6. 
6.1 Delay, Loss, and Throughput Approximations 
We measure delay when the network is adequately provisioned or over-provisioned (and thus experiences little loss) 
and then we simulate an attack on router E6. This scenario is illustrated in figure 4. Under light load, the end-to-end 
delay of El  - E6 link is 100 ms; E l  - E7 delay is 100 ms; and E5 - E4 delay is 160 ms. With the attack traffic, the 
average delay of the E l  - E6 link increases up to 180 ms (figure 4(b)). Since all the core router to core router links 
have a higher capacity than other links, C4 - E6 becomes the most congested link, increasing the delay for all traffic 
traversing E6. The delay of the E5 - E4 link does not increase because this path is not congested. Therefore, delay 
patterns are a good indication of the presence of excess traffic inside a network domain. As previously discussed, the 
frequency of delay probing is a critical parameter. Sending fewer probes reduces overhead but using only a few probes 
can produce inaccurate estimation, especially that some of the probes are lost in the presence of excess traffic. Figure 
5 shows that introducing more delay probes may increase the delay of actual traffic. Figure 5 (b) shows that sending 
only 5 probes per second is inadequate because as much as 80% of the probes may be lost. Sending probes at a rate of 
10 to 15 per second is a good choice in this experiment. 
Figure 6 shows loss approximation using the core-assisted scheme. As the scheme uses an exponential weighted 
moving average of the drop values and the number of incoming packets traversing edge routers, the initial approx- 
imated values deviate from the actual values. Thus initial data (the first two seconds) should be discarded. The 
approximated value is very close to the actual one after that. According to the simulation setup, link C4 - E6 exhibits 
an increased loss ratio for the E l  - E6 as depicted in figure 6.  
Using striped probes for loss inference (as proposed in [ 151) produces reasonably accurate approxin~ations if core 
routers do not employ active queue management or service differentiation. In assured forwarding, packets marked 
as "red" have a high drop probability while "green" packets have low drop probability. We send stripes of different 
colors to infer loss in this case. Figure 7 shows the loss of probes with different drop precedences. Figure 8 depicts 

















t i t t ,
ti . I1 ],
]. , 1 m imum t .
[1 ]
r i ations.
li l . ,










0 t 5 i i i t i i t.
s .
i r e t l t i i t t i t , t i iti l
i t l i t t t l l . i iti l t t i t t l i .
r i t l i r l t t t l ft r t t. r i t t i l ti t , li i it
i r l r ti f r t i t i fi r .
i tri r f r l i f r ( r i [ ]) r r l r t r imations if r
r t rs t l ti t r r i iff r ti ti . I r f r r i , t r
s i ilit il " t l ilit . t i f i t
l r t i f r l i t i . i r t l r it iff r t r r . i r i t
8
the inferred loss of link C4 - E6 using these stiiped unicast probes at different frequencies. The objective of this 
experiment is to determine how often a stripe should be sent to infer loss accurately. The figure shows that at least 20 
stripes per second are required to infer a loss ratio close to the actual value. The figure also demonstrates that a longer 
time is required for convergence in the striped-based scheme than in the core-assisted scheme. 
Figure 9 shows the throughput approximation of different flows traversing a network domain. 'There are several 
aggregate flows going through the domain. We measure throughpi~t for flow F1 that follows the path E3 to E6, flow 
F2 that follows path E l  to E6. flow F3 that follows path E2 - E6. and flow F4 that follows path E5 - E4. Other 
aggregate flows follow paths E l  - E7 and E3 - E'i. The throughput approxin~ation proced~~re  (discussed in section 
4) is used to compute the average rate at the egress routers. Figure 9 shows an initial fluctuation between actual and 
approxiinated throughput measuren~ents due to the average calculation. After a few seconds, the values are close to 
each other. Measurement at the egress routers detects distributed attacks entering through different ingress routers of 
a domain. 
6.2 Detecting Attacks and Service Violations 
In this section, we demonstrate the detection of mild and severe distributed denial of service attacks. In figures 10 and 
11, label "No attack" means the network does not have sigi~ificant raffic in excess of its capacity. This scenario has 
little loss inside the network domain. This is the normal case with proper network provisioning and traffic conditioning 
at the edge routers. Labels "Attack I '' and "Attack 2" denote situations when traffic is injected into the network domain 
from different ingress points. At each ingress point the flows do not violate any profiles. but the aggregate traffic is 
excessive. The intensity of the attacks is increased during time t=15 secorlds to t=45 secorids. The delay increases 
by 30% during Attack 1 and by 50% during Attack 2 (figure 10). Packet drops of I5 to 25% result in case of Attack 
1, and drops of more than 35% result with Attack 2, as depicted in figure I I .  We use equation (7) to compute overall 
traffic loss in the QoS network. 
The SLA Monitor (SLAM) can thus aid in the detection of denial of service (DoS) and distributed DoS (DDoS) 
attacks in a network domain. When the SLAM detects an anoinaly (high delay and high loss), it polls the edge devices 
for throughputs of existing flows, in order to detect high bandwidth aggregates. This is similar to the method used 
in 1211. where aggregate-based congestion control (ACC) agents match the prefix of the IP destination addresses to 
declare high bandwidth flows going t~ tlie same destination address. In our core-assisted scheme, the core router 
siinilarly sends the packet drop information. together with the source and destination IP addresses to the SLAM. The 
SLAM performs IP prefix matching to detect any possible DDoS attack through this domain. If there is an attack; the 
SLAM sends control information to all ingress routers to throttle (filter out) packets of this flow or at least control their 
rates. The differentiated services architecture can help to propagate such messages to the upstream domain all the way 
to the source if possible. 
6.3 Comparative Evaluation 
Based on our experiments, we present a quantitative measure of performance to compare the core-assisted, load- 
based and edge-to-edge approaches. We used the topology shown in figure 3 to experiment with the approaches. 
We compare communication overhead, accuracy, convergence time, in~plen~entation overhead, and flexibility. We 
consider a domain 2) with A4 edge routers and M core routers. The total injected probes and size of each probe packet 
are used to compute the communication overhead in bytes. In the edge-to-edge approach, a stripe of s packets is 
transmitted from the monitor to every egress routers pair. For the network domain; the total number of probe packets 
is s x (A4 - 1 )  x (A4 - 2) x f .  where f is the frequency of stripes per unit time. The communication overhead is 
therefore s x (A4 - 1) x ( M  - 2) x f x packet-size. 
The core-assisted loss measurement scheme overhead depends on the number of packets core routers send to the 
SLAM to report excessive drop for certain flows. We assume there are F flows traversing each edge router, and each 
flow has P packets on average. We define 0 as the percentage of misbehaving flows. If d bytes are required to record 
drop information of each flow, then each core needs to send C = max(1: p a ~ ~ e ~ _ x s ' ! e )  control packets to the SLAM. 
To compute the loss ratio, the inonitor queries all edges for packet count infornlation of the misbehaving flows. Every 
edge will reply to this query. The total number of packets exchanged is (2116 + N )  x C packets (recall that N is the 
number of core routers). Therefore. the communication overhead is (2nd + AT) x C x packetsize. We compute 
the communication overhead for the core-assisted approach based on attack infor~nation provided in [24]. In [24], the 
authors observed an average of 4268 backscatter attacks per week over a three week period of time by monitoring a 
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sole ingress link into a lightly utilized 18 network. They show that 50% of the attacks last for 10 minutes. 30% last for 
30 minutes, 17% last for 60 minutes. 2% last for 5 hours and I % last for 10 hours or more. 
Accuracy is computed using the deviations of approximating the loss ratio from the actual loss ratio value. We 
calculate accuracy based on our experimental results: with f = 20 as the probing frequency for the edge-to-edge 
approach. Implementation overhead considers which components of the network must be modified. The edge-to- 
edge approach needs to modify only edge routers, while the core-assisted approach requires change to both edge and 
core routers. The edge-to-edge scheme is thus considered more flexible since it is easier to deploy. However, the 
core-assisted approach gives more insight into the performance characteristics of the network domain and has higher 
accuracy and shorter convergence time. Figure 12 depicts a quantitative comparison of the three approaches. Note 
that we use a high percentage of misbehaving flows as in [24]. For a large domain with millions of flows per second, 
the core-assisted approach exhibits a higher communication overhead over a short period with many attacks. but it has 
a lower overhead over a longer time scale. The load-based approach is the same as the edge-to-edge approach in all 
respects. except that it reduces com~nunication overhead by probing only the necessary regions. 
7 Conclusions 
We have investigated methods to detect service level agreement violations in QoS networks. These methods are 
useful for network re-dimensioning. as well as for detection of denial of service and bandwidth theft attacks. The 
core-assisted loss measurement method is powerful but difficult to deploy. An alternative edge-to-edge stripe-based 
loss inference scheme for different drop precedences was thus proposed. In the edge-to-edge probing approach. a 
low network probing rate has been shown to give incorrect results due to the loss of probes in case of excess traffic 
caused by an attack. A large number of probes, however. increases actual traffic delay and loss. We have shown that 
using probes with different drop precedences is necessary to infer loss in a QoS network. Our proposed load-based 
monitoring technique can aid in detecting attacks such as malicious traffic remarking or injection: without excessive 
overhead. Our approach can be integrated with an adaptive admission control or flow control scheme to regulate traffic 
dynainically and control an attack as soon as it is detected. The scheme can be used in any general network architecture 
(not only a QoS netwoi-k). 
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Figure 5 :  (a) Link delay slightly changes when more probes are introduced. (b) Probing at a low rate may be affected 
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